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STUDENT NOTES
NATURALizATiON

PROCEEDINGS--OATH

TAL RESERVATIONS AS TO BEARING

OF

ALLEGIANC,-MEN-

ARM.-Macintosh,

Canadian

professor in the Yale Divinity School, was denied citizenship in
naturalization proceedings before the District Court for Connecticut when he affirmed a willingness to bear arms for this country
only when the war in which the United States might be engaged
was justifiable, as he saw it, under the will of God. Later the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, deciding that such
support as the applicant was willing to give according to his
statement was all that the Naturalization Act required of him.1
The Naturalization Act requires of all aliens applying for
citizenship an oath which must substantially state "that he will
support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States
against all enemies, domestic or foreign, and bear true faith and
allegiance to the same" and also that the applicant takes the
oath "freely and without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion" 2 The Federal Constitution vests in the Congress the
power to press citizens into military service.' Hence the oath of
the Naturalization Act would require any applicant to be
amenable to military service.
As the Court of Appeals in the Macintosh case states, an exception to this duty to bear arms is made in the case of persons
whose religious scruples are against warfare.' Reasoning that
Macintosh's reservation was purely one of religious scruple, which
was tolerated and approved by the laws of this country, the Court
of Appeals affirmed his right to citizenship, denying his statements
constituted such a mental reservation as would disable him.
But, then, is Macintosh's reservation, saving to himself the
right to determine whether any war is conscionable or not, such a,
religious scruple as he is entitled to maintain ? The Selective Draft
Case, cited by the court to sustain its point, makes but bare reference to the Selective Draft Act of May 18, 1917. That Act is most
susceptible to the interpretation that only those religious organizations whose tenets are against all and any wars are to fall within
142 F. (2d) 845 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1930).
2 34 Stat. 596 (1906) 8 U. S. C. A. (1926) § 381.
8 Constitution, Art. 1, § 8.
'See Arver v. U. S. (Selective Draft Cases), 245 U. S. 366, 38 S. Ct. 159

(1917).
8

Supra n. 4.
640 Stat. 76 (1917) 50 U. S. C. A. (1926)

§ 226 n.
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the exemption under the said Act.7 The Act of January 31, 19038,
cited by the same court for the same purpose in Bland v. United
Statese, is identical with the 1917 Act. One Act, June 3, 1916,
does say that persons who claim exemption from military service
because of religious belief shall not be required to serve; but it
also states that the conscientious holding of such belief must be
established under such regulations as the President shall prescribe.0 This may be construed as the Circuit Court of Appeals
construed the law in the Macintosh case; but the language of the
later and other Acts, which are worded differently, and which
the Court of Appeals depend upon in its decision would rather
lead one to construe the Act of June 3, 1916 in accord with these
other Acts. Assuming similar Draft Acts in the future to follow
the standard form of exemptions laid down in the Acts of January
31, 1903 and May 18, 1917,' if Macintosh's personal religion is
sufficient to excuse his bearing arms, and constitutes a religious
scruple within the meaning of these Acts, it would follow that all
the citizens of this country would be entitled to bear the same or
similar religious scruples and could refuse to fight under the
same construction of the Acts for them. This, needless to say,
would hardly be the construction our courts would put on any
wartime measures, necessitating so impractical a result. Hence
it seems that the Court of Appeals has placed an illogical construction upon these Acts in order to pin their decision in the
Macintosh case on it.
In United States v. Schwimmer the Supreme Court of the
United States decided that the application for naturalization should
be denied because Mrs. Schwimmer, a fifty year old woman, absolutely refused to bear arms, being an uncompromising pacifist.
However, she was willing to do anything else in the line of noncombative activities required of her by the government. Mr.
Justice Holmes, with whom Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred, dissented briefly, stating that to his notion the question of Mrs.
Schwimmer's bearing arms, being a woman over fifty, was a literal
absurdity and hence so far as her ability was concerned she had
7"lNothing in this Act shall bd construed to compel any person to serve
in any of the forces herein provided for who is found to be a member of any
well-recognized religious sect or organization, at present organized and existing, and, whose eisting creed or principles forbid its members to participate
in war of any form."
832 Stat. 775 (1903).

F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1930).
39 Stat. 197 (1916) 32 U. S. 0. A. (1926) § 1 p. 3.
"Supra n. 8 and 6.
279 U. S. 644, 49 S. Ct. 448 (1929).
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agreed to perform every function under the Constitution and
laws of United States of which she would be capable. It would
appear that Mrs. Sehwimmer in one aspect presented a stronger
case there for the court than Macintosh has here-the former
really swore to do all that was actually within her power, while
the latter reserves to himself and adopts merely conditionally, the
naturalization oath, only so far as it does not conflict with his own
ideas.
From another viewpoint the cases are the same, both Mrs.
Schwimmer and Macintosh making reservations. The fact that
Mrs. Schwimmer's reservation against bearing arms was absolute
disqualified her; Macintosh does this, but to a lesser degree, making a purely conditional reservation. Yet if we are able to interpret the Naturalization Act strictly" and resolve all questions of
doubt in favor of the United States in such proceedings, as has
been laid down14 , the Act requires that the applicant must take the
oath without any mental reservation. Courts also have laid down
the rule that no reservations whatever may be kept by the applicant.' The Macintosh case has gone before the Supreme Court
No doubt applicants 'f the national prominence and position
of Mr. Macintosh represent a highly desirable type of alien, to
which type the United States should bend further efforts for
naturalizing. The Court of Appeals has certainly reactied a result which is socially desirable in this case. Yet in so doing they
have employed a method of reasoning which is liable to prove a
future "incubus" of a sort for them; and in trying to explain
away the Schwimmer case they have only shown that if their
decision does not actually fly in the face of the Schwimmer decision, they are at least "tacking hard against the wind".
-HENRY P. SNYDER.
'upra n. 2.

14U. S. v. Manzi, 276 U. S. 463, 48 S. Ct. 328 (1928).

In re D, 290 F. 863 (N. D. Ohio, 1923).
Since the six to three decision in the Schwimmer case, which was decided
against Mrs. Schwimmer in 1928, the personnel of the Court has changed. In
that case Mr. Justice Butler rendered the opinion, and the concurring justices
were Mr. Chief Justice Taft, MacReynolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland and
Stone. Those dissenting were, Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis,
and Mr. Justice Sanford. Hughes has now succeeded Taft as the Chief
Justice and Roberts has succeeded to Sanford's position. The general belief
is that Hughes may be classified as a liberal. And Stone, though with the
conservative Butler side in the Schwimmer case, is usually found on the
other side; hence it is not improbable that he might shift his position in the
Macintosh case. As yet, Roberts is still an enigma on the bench. Conse.
quently this change in personnel makes it quite likely that the Court may hand
down a decision affirming the Court of Appeals in the Macintosh case.
10
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